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ABSTRACT
We document cash management patterns for households that   are at odds with the predictions of deterministic
inventory  models that abstract from precautionary motives. We extend  the Baumol-Tobin cash inventory
model to a dynamic  environment that allows for the possibility of withdrawing  cash at random times
at a low cost. This modification   introduces a precautionary motive for holding cash and   naturally
captures developments in withdrawal technology,  such as the increasing diffusion of bank branches
and ATM  terminals. We characterize the solution of the model and  show that qualitatively it is able
to reproduce the  empirical patterns. Estimating the  structural parameters we  show that the model
quantitatively accounts for key features  of the data. The estimates are used to quantify the  expenditure
and interest rate elasticity of money demand,  the impact of financial innovation on money demand,
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There is a large literature arguing that ¯nancial innovation is important for under-
standing money demand, yet seldom this literature integrates the empirical analysis
with an explicit modeling of the ¯nancial innovation. In this paper we develop a dy-
namic inventory model of money demand that explicitly incorporates the e®ects of
¯nancial innovation on cash management. We estimate the structural parameters of
the model using detailed micro data from Italian households, and use the estimates
to revisit several classic questions on money demand.
As standard in the inventory theory we assume that non-negative cash holdings
are needed to pay for consumption purchases. We extend the Baumol-Tobin model
to a dynamic environment which allows for the opportunity of withdrawing cash at
random times at low or zero cost. Cash withdrawals at any other time involve a
¯xed cost, b. In particular, the expected number of such opportunities per period
of time is described by a single parameter, p. Examples of such opportunities are
¯nding an ATM that does not charge a fee, or passing by a bank desk at a time
with a low opportunity cost. Another interpretation of p is that it measures the
probability that an ATM terminal is working properly or a bank desk is open for
business. Financial innovations, such as the increase in the number bank branches
and ATM terminals, can be modeled by increases in p and decreases in b.
Our model changes the predictions of the Baumol-Tobin model (BT henceforth)
in ways that are consistent with stylized facts concerning households' cash man-
agement behavior. The randomness introduced by p gives rise to a precautionary
motive for holding cash: when agents have an opportunity to withdraw cash at
zero cost they do so even if they have some cash at hand. Thus, the average cash
balances held at the time of a withdrawal relative to the average cash holdings,
M=M, is a measure of the strength of the precautionary motive. This ratio ranges
between zero and one and is increasing in p. Using household data for Italy and the
US we document that M=M is about 0.4, instead of being zero as predicted by the
BT model. Another property of our model is that the number of withdrawals, n,
increases with p, and the average withdrawal size W decreases, with W=M ranging
between zero and two. Using data from Italian households we measure values of n
and W=M that are inconsistent with those predicted by the BT model.
The model studies how to ¯nance a constant °ow of cash expenditures, the value
of which is taken as given both in the theory and in the empirical implementa-
tion. Hence the model abstracts from the cash/credit choice i.e. from the choice of
1whether to have a credit card, and for those that have a credit card, of whether a
particular purchase is done using cash or credit. Formally, we are assuming separa-
bility between cash vs. credit purchases. We are able to study this problem for the
Italian households because we have a measure of the consumption purchases done
with cash. We view our paper as an input on the study of the cash/credit decision,
an important topic that we plan to address in the future.
We organize the analysis as follows. In Section 2 we use a panel data of Italian
households to illustrate key cash management patterns, including the strength of
precautionary motive, to compare them to the predictions of the BT model, and
motivate the analysis that follows.
Sections 3 and 4 present the theory. Section 3 analyzes the e®ect of ¯nancial
di®usion using a version of the BT model where agents have a deterministic number
of free withdrawals per period. This model provides a simple illustration of how
technology a®ects the level and the shape of the money demand (i.e. its interest
and expenditure elasticities). Section 4 introduces our benchmark stochastic dy-
namic inventory model. In this model agents have random meetings with a ¯nancial
intermediary in which they can withdraw money at no cost, a stochastic version of
the model of Section 3. We solve analytically for the Bellman equation and char-
acterize its optimal decision rule. We derive the distribution of currency holdings,
the aggregate money demand, the average number of withdrawals, the average size
of withdrawals, and the average cash balances at the time of a withdrawal. We
show that a single index of technology, b ¢ p2, determines both the shape of the
money demand and the strength its precautionary component. While technological
improvements (higher p and lower b) unambiguously decrease the level of money
demand, their e®ect on this index ¡and hence on the shape and the precaution-
ary component of money demand¡ is ambiguous. The structural estimation of the
model parameters will allow us to shed light on this issue. We conclude the section
with the analysis of the welfare implications of our model and a comparison with
the standard analysis as reviewed in Lucas (2000).
Sections 5, 6 and 7 contain the empirical analysis. In Section 5 we estimate the
model using the panel data for Italian households. The two parameters p and b are
overidenti¯ed because we observe four dimensions of household behavior: M, W,
M and n. We argue that the model has a satisfactory statistical ¯t and that the
patterns of the estimates are reasonable. For instance, we ¯nd that the parameters
for the households with an ATM card indicate their access to a better technology
(higher p and lower b). The estimates also indicate that technology is better in
2locations with higher density of ATM terminals and bank branches. Section 6 stud-
ies the implications of our ¯ndings for the time pattern of technology and for the
expenditure and interest elasticity of the demand for currency. The estimated pa-
rameters reproduce the sizeable precautionary holdings present in the data. Even
though our model can generate interest rate elasticities between zero and 1/2, and
expenditure elasticities between 1/2 and one, the values implied by our estimates
are close to 1/2 for both, the values of the BT model. We discuss how to reconcile
our estimates of the interest rate elasticity with the smaller values typically found
in the literature.1 In Section 7 we use the estimates to quantify the welfare cost of
in°ation ¡in particular the gains from the Italian disin°ation in the 1990s¡ and the
bene¯ts of ATM card ownership.
2 Cash Holdings Patterns of Italian Households
Table 1 presents some statistics on the cash holdings patterns by Italian households
based on the Survey of Household Income and Wealth.2 For each year we report
cross section means of statistics where the unit of analysis is the household. We
report statistics separately for households with and without ATM cards. All these
households have checking accounts that pay interests at rates documented below.
The survey records the household expenditure paid in cash during the year (we
use cash and currency interchangeably to denote the value of coins and banknotes).
The table displays these expenditures as a fraction of total consumption expenditure.
The fraction paid with cash is smaller for households with an ATM card, it displays
a downward trend for both type of households, though its value remains sizeable
as of 2004. These percentages are comparable to those for the US between 1984
and 1995.3 The table reports the sample mean of the ratio M=c, where M is the
1We remark that our interest rate elasticity, as in the BT model, refers to the ratio of money
stock to cash consumption. Of course if cash consumption relative to total consumption is a
function of interest rates, as in the Stokey-Lucas cash credit model, the elasticity of money to
total consumption will be even higher. A similar argument applies to the expenditure elasticity.
The distinction is important to compare our results with estimates in the literature, that typically
use money/total consumption. See for instance Lucas (2000), who uses aggregate US data, or
Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli (2002), who use the same household data used here.
2This is a periodic survey of the Bank of Italy that collects data on several social and economic
characteristics. The cash management information that we are interested in is only available since
1993.
3Humphrey (2004) estimates that the mean share of total expenditures paid with currency in
the US is 36% and 28% in 1984 and 1995, respectively. If expenditures paid with checks are
added to those paid with currency, the resulting statistics is about 85% and 75% in 1984 and
1995, respectively. The measure including checks is used by Cooley and Hansen (1991) to compute
3average currency held by the household during a year and c is the daily expenditure
paid with currency. We notice that relative to c Italian households hold about
twice as much cash than US households between 1984 and 1995.4 Table 1 reports
three statistics that are useful to assess the empirical performance of deterministic
inventory models, such as the classic one by Baumol and Tobin.
The ¯rst statistic is the ratio between currency holdings at the time of a with-
drawal (M) and average currency holdings in each year (M). While this ratio is zero
in deterministic inventory-theoretic models, its sample mean in the data is about
0.4. A comparable statistic for US households is about 0.3 in 1984, 1986 and 1995
(see Table 1 in Porter and Judson, 1996). The second one is the ratio between the
withdrawal amount (W) and average currency holdings. While this ratio is 2 in
the BT model, it is smaller in the data. The sample mean of this ratio for house-
holds with an ATM card is below 1.4, and for those without ATM is slightly below
2. The inspection of the raw data shows that there is substantial variation across
provinces and indeed the median across households is about 1.0 for households with
and without ATM.5 The third statistic is the normalized number of withdrawals
per year. The normalization is chosen so that in BT this statistic is equal to 1. In
particular, in the BT model the following accounting identity holds, nW = c, and
since withdrawals only happen when cash balances reach zero, then M = W=2. As
the table shows the sample mean of this statistic is well above 1, especially so for
households with ATM.
The second statistic, W
M, and the third, n
c=(2M), are related through the accounting
identity c = nW. In particular, if W=M is smaller than 2 and the identity holds
then the third statistic must be above 1. Yet we present separate sample means for
these statistics because of the large measurement error in all these variables. This
is informative because W enters in the ¯rst statistic but not in the second and c
enters in the third but not in the second. In the estimation section of the paper
we document and consider the e®ect of measurement error systematically, without
altering the conclusion about the drawbacks of deterministic inventory theoretical
the share of cash expenditures for households in the US where, contrary to the practice in Italy,
checking accounts did not pay an interest. For comparison, the mean share of total expenditures
paid with currency by all Italian households is 65% in 1995.
4Porter and Judson (1996), using currency and expenditure paid with currency, estimate that
M=c is about 7 days both in 1984 and in 1986, and 10 in 1995. A calculation for Italy following
the same methodology yields about 20 and 17 days in 1993 and 1995, respectively.
5An alternative source for the average ATM withdrawal, based on banks' reports, can be com-
puted using Tables 12.1 and 13.1 in the ECB Blue Book (2006). These values are similar, indeed
somewhat smaller, than the corresponding values from the household data (see the Online Ap-
pendix L1).
4Table 1: Households' currency management
Variable 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004
Expenditure share paid w/ currencya
w/o ATM 0.68 0.67 0.63 0.66 0.65 0.63
w. ATM 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.55 0.52 0.47
Currencyb: M=c (c per day)
w/o ATM 15 17 19 18 17 18
w. ATM 10 11 13 12 13 14
M per Household, in 2004 eurosc
w/o ATM 430 490 440 440 410 410
w. ATM 370 410 370 340 330 350
Currency at withdrawalsd: M=M
w/o ATM 0.41 0.31 0.47 0.46 0.46 na
w. ATM 0.42 0.30 0.39 0.45 0.41 na
Withdrawale: W=M
w/o ATM 2.3 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9
w. ATM 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4
# of withdrawals: n (per year)f
w/o ATM 16 17 25 24 23 23
w. ATM 50 51 59 64 58 63
Normalized: n
c=(2M) (c per year)f
w/o ATM 1.2 1.4 2.6 2.0 1.7 2.0
w. ATM 2.4 2.7 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.1
# of observationsg 6,938 6,970 6,089 7,005 7,112 7,159
The unit of observation is the household. Entries are sample means computed using sample weights.
Only households with a checking account and whose head is not self-employed are included, which
accounts for about 85% of the sample observations.
Notes: - aRatio of expenditures paid with cash to total expenditures (durables, non-durables and
services). - bAverage currency during the year divided by daily expenditures paid with cash. -
cThe average number of adults per household is 2.3. In 2004 one euro in Italy was equivalent to
1.25 USD in USA, PPP adjusted (Source: the World Bank ICP tables). - dAverage currency at
the time of withdrawal as a ratio to average currency. - eAverage withdrawal during the year as
a ratio to average currency. - fThe entries with n = 0 are coded as missing values. - gNumber of
respondents for whom the currency and the cash consumption data are available in each survey.
Data on withdrawals are supplied by a smaller number of respondents. Source: Bank of Italy -
Survey of Household Income and Wealth.
models.
For each year Table 2 reports the mean and standard deviation across provinces
for the di®usion of bank branches and ATM terminals, and for two components of the
opportunity cost of holding cash: interest rate paid on deposits and the probability
of cash being stolen. The di®usion of Bank branches and ATM terminals varies
signi¯cantly across provinces and is increasing through time. Di®erences in the
nominal interest rate across time are due mainly to the disin°ation. The variation
of nominal interest rates across provinces mostly re°ects the segmentation of banking
5Table 2: Financial innovation and the opportunity cost of cash
Variable 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004
Bank branchesa 0.38 0.42 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.55
(0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
ATM terminalsa 0.31 0.39 0.50 0.57 0.65 0.65
(0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22)
Interest rate on depositsb 6.1 5.4 2.2 1.7 1.1 0.7
(0.4) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
Probability of cash theftc 2.2 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2
(2.6) (2.1) (2.4) (2.5) (2.4) (2.6)
CPI In°ation 4.6 5.2 2.0 2.6 2.6 2.3
Notes: Mean (standard deviation in parenthesis) across provinces. - a Per thousand resi-
dents (Source: the Supervisory Reports to the Bank of Italy and the Italian Central Credit
Register). - b Net nominal interest rates in per cent. Arithmetic average between the self-
reported interest on deposit account (Source: Survey of Household Income and Wealth)
and the average deposit interest rate reported by banks in the province (Source: Central
credit register). - c We estimate this probability using the time and province variation from
statistics on reported crimes on Purse snatching and pickpocketing. The level is adjusted
to take into account both the fraction of unreported crimes as well as the fraction of cash
stolen for di®erent types of crimes using survey data on victimization rates (Source: Istat
and authors' computations; see the Online Appendix A for details).
markets. The large di®erences in the probability of cash being stolen across provinces
re°ect variation in crime rates across rural vs. urban areas, and a higher incidence
of such crimes in the North.
Lippi and Secchi (2007) report that the household data display patterns which
are in line with previous empirical studies showing that the demand for currency
decreases with ¯nancial development and that its interest elasticity is below one-
half.6 Tables 1 and 2 show that the opportunity cost of cash in 2004 is about 1/3
of the value in 1993 (the corresponding ratio for the nominal interest rate is about
1/9), and that the average of M=c shows an upward trend. Indeed the average of
M=c across households of a given type (with and without ATM cards) is negatively
correlated with the opportunity cost R in the cross section, in the time series, and
the pool time series-cross section. Yet the largest estimate for the interest rate
elasticity are smaller than 0.25 and in most cases about 0.05 (in absolute value). At
6They estimate that the elasticity of cash holdings with respect to the interest rate is about
zero for agents who hold an ATM card and -0.2 for agents without ATM card.
6the same time, Table 2 shows large increases in bank branches and ATM terminals
per person. Such patterns are consistent with both shifts of the money demand and
movements along it. Our model and estimation strategy allows us to quantify each
of them.
Another classic model of money demand is Miller and Orr (1966) who study the
optimal inventory policy for an agent subject to stochastic cash in°ows and out°ows.
Despite the presence of uncertainty, their model, as the one by BT, does not feature
a precautionary motive in the sense that M = 0. Unlike in the BT model, they ¯nd
that the interest rate elasticity is 1=3 and the average withdrawal size W=M is 3/4.
In this paper we keep the BT model as a theoretical benchmark because the Miller
and Orr model is more suitable for the problem faced by ¯rms, given the nature
of stochastic cash in°ows and out°ows. Our paper studies currency demand by
households: the theory studies the optimal inventory policy for an agent that faces
deterministic cash out°ows (consumption expenditure) and no cash in°ows and the
empirical analysis uses the household survey data (excluding entrepreneurs).
3 A model with deterministic free withdrawals
This section presents a modi¯ed version of the BT model to illustrate how techno-
logical progress a®ects the level and interest elasticity of the demand for currency.
Consider an agent who ¯nances a consumption °ow c by making n withdrawals
from a deposit account. Let R be the net nominal interest rate paid on deposits.
In a deterministic setting agents cash balances decrease until they hit zero, when
a new withdrawal must take place. Hence the size of each withdrawal is W = c=n
and the average cash balance M = W=2. In the BT model agents pay a ¯xed cost
b for each withdrawal. We modify the latter by assuming that the agent has p free
withdrawals, so that if the total number of withdrawals is n then she pays only
for the excess of n over p. Setting p = 0 yields the BT case. Technology is thus
represented by the parameters b and p.
For example, assume that the cost of a withdrawal is proportional to the distance
to an ATM or bank branch. In a given period the agent is moving across locations,
for reason unrelated to her cash management, so that p is the number of times that
she is in a location with an ATM or bank branch. At any other time, b is the
distance that the agent must travel to withdraw. In this setup an increase in the
density of bank branches or ATMs increases p and decreases b.







+ bmax(n ¡ p ; 0)
i
: (1)
It is immediate that the value of n that solves the problem, and its associated M=c,
depends only on ¯ ´ b=(c R), the ratio of the two costs, and p. The money demand



















To understand the workings of the model, ¯x b and consider the e®ect of increasing
p (so that ^ b increases). For p = 0 we have the BT setup, so that when R is small
the agent decides to economize on withdrawals and choose a large value of M. Now
consider the case of p > 0. In this case there is no reason to have less than p
withdrawals, since these are free by assumption. Hence, for all R · 2^ b the agent
will choose the same level money holdings, namely, M = c=(2p), since she is not
paying for any withdrawal but is subject to a positive opportunity cost. Note that
the interest elasticity is zero for R · 2^ b. Thus as p (hence ^ b) increases, then the
money demand has a lower level and a lower interest rate elasticity than the money
demand from the BT model. Indeed (2) implies that the range of interest rates
R for which the money demand is smaller and has lower interest rate elasticity is
increasing in p. On the other hand, if we ¯x ^ b and increase p the only e®ect is to
lower the level of the money demand. The previous discussion makes clear that for
¯xed p; ^ b controls the \shape" of the money demand, and for ¯xed ^ b, p controls
its level. We think of technological improvements as both increasing p and lowering
b: the net e®ect on ^ b, hence on the slope of the money demand, is in principle
ambiguous. The empirical analysis below allows us to sign and quantify this e®ect.
4 A model with random free withdrawals
This section presents our benchmark model that generalizes the example of the pre-
vious section in several dimensions. It takes an explicit account of the dynamic
nature of the cash inventory problem, as opposed to minimizing the average steady
state cost. It distinguishes between real and nominal variables, as opposed to ¯nanc-
ing a constant nominal expenditure, or alternatively assuming zero in°ation. Most
8importantly, it assumes that the agent has a Poisson arrival of free opportunities
to withdraw cash at a rate p. Relative to the deterministic model, this assumption
produces cash management behavior that is closer to the one documented in Section
2. The randomness gives rise to a precautionary motive, so that some withdrawals
occur when the agent still has a positive cash balance and the (average) W=M ratio
is smaller than two. The model retains the feature, discussed in Section 3, that the
interest rate elasticity is smaller than 1=2 and is decreasing in the parameter p. It
also generalizes the sense in which the \shape" of the money demand depends on
the parameter ^ b = p2b=c.
4.1 The agent's problem
We assume that agents are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint and minimize
the cost of ¯nancing a given constant °ow of cash consumption, denoted by c. Let




= ¡c ¡ m(t)¼ (3)
for almost all t ¸ 0: Agents can withdraw or deposit at any time from an account
that yields real interest r. Transfers from the interest bearing account to cash
balances are indicated by discontinuities in m: a withdrawal is a jump up on the
cash balances, i.e. m(t+) ¡ m(t¡) > 0; and likewise for a deposit.
There are two sources or randomness in the environment, described by indepen-
dent Poisson processes with intensities p1 and p2. The ¯rst process describes the
arrivals of \free adjustment opportunities" (see the Introduction for examples). The
second Poisson process describes the arrivals of times where the agent looses (or is
stolen) her cash balances. We assume that a ¯xed cost b is paid for each adjustment,
unless it happens exactly at the time of a free adjustment opportunity.

























subject to (3) and m(t) ¸ 0, where ¿j denote the stopping times at which an
adjustment (jump) of m takes place, and m(0) = m is given. The indicator I¿j
is zero ¡so the cost is not paid¡ if the adjustment takes place at a time of a free
9adjustment opportunity, otherwise is equal to one. The expectation is taken with
respect to the two Poisson processes. The parameters that de¯ne this problem are
r;¼;p1;p2;b and c.
4.2 Bellman equations and optimal policy
We turn to the characterization of the Bellman equations and of its associated
optimal policy. We will guess, and later verify, that the optimal policy is described
by two thresholds for m: 0 < m¤ < m¤¤. The threshold m¤ is the value of cash
that agents choose after a contact with a ¯nancial intermediary: we refer to it as
the optimal cash replenishment level. The threshold m¤¤ is a value of cash beyond
which agents will pay the cost b, contact the intermediary, and make a deposit so as
to leave her cash balances at m¤. Assuming that the optimal policy is of this type
and that for m 2 (0;m¤¤) the value function G is di®erentiable, it must satisfy:
rG(m) = G
0 (m)(¡c ¡ ¼m) + p1 min
^ m¸0
[^ m ¡ m + G(^ m) ¡ G(m)] + (5)
+ p2 min
^ m¸0
[b + ^ m + G(^ m) ¡ G(m)] :
If the agent chooses not to contact the intermediary then, as standard, the Bellman
equation states that the return on the value function rG(m) must equal the °ow
cost plus the expected change per unit of time. The ¯rst term of the summation
gives the change in the value function per unit of time, conditional on no arrival of
either free adjustment or of a cash theft. This change is given by the change in the
state m, times the derivative of the value function G0 (m). The second term gives
the expected change conditional on the arrival of free adjustment opportunity: an
adjustment ^ m ¡ m is incurred instantly with its associated \capital gain" G(^ m) ¡
G(m). Likewise, the third term gives the change in the value function conditional
on the money stock m being stolen. In this case the cost b must be paid and
the adjustment equals ^ m, since m is \lost". Regardless of how the agent ends up
matched with a ¯nancial intermediary, upon the match she chooses the optimal level




^ m + G(^ m) : (6)
Note that the optimal replenishment level m¤ is constant. There are two boundary
conditions for this problem. First, if money balances reach zero (m = 0) the agent
10must withdraw, otherwise she will violate the non-negativity constraint in the next
instant. Second, for values of m ¸ m¤¤ we conjecture that the agent chooses to pay
b and deposit the extra amount, m ¡ m¤. Combining these boundary conditions
with (5) we have:
G(m) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
b + m¤ + G(m¤) if m = 0
¡G0 (m)(c + ¼m) + (p1 + p2)[m¤ + G(m¤)] + p2b ¡ p1m
r + p1 + p2
if m 2 (0;m¤¤)
b + m¤ ¡ m + G(m¤) if m ¸ m¤¤
(7)
For the assumed con¯guration to be optimal it must be the case that the agent
prefers not to pay the cost b and adjust money balances in the relevant range:
m + G(m) < b + m
¤ + G(m
¤) all m 2 (0;m
¤¤) : (8)
Summarizing, we say that m¤;m¤¤; G(¢) solve the Bellman equation for the total
cost problem (4) if they satisfy (6)-(7)-(8).
We ¯nd it convenient to reformulate this problem so that it is closer to the
standard inventory theoretical models. We de¯ne a related problem where the agent
minimizes the shadow cost













¡rtR m(t + ¿j)dt
¸)
(9)
subject to (3), m(t) ¸ 0; where ¿j denote the stopping times at which an adjustment
(jump) of m takes place, and m(0) = m is given. The indicator I¿j equals zero if
the adjustment takes place at the time of a free adjustment, otherwise is equal to
one. In this formulation R is the opportunity cost of holding cash. In this problem
there is only one Poisson process with intensity p describing the arrival of a free
opportunity to adjust. The parameters of this problem are r;R;¼;p;b and c.7
The derivation of the Bellman equation for an agent unmatched with a ¯nancial
intermediary and holding a real value of cash m follows by the same logic used
7The shadow cost formulation is the standard one used in the literature for inventory theoretical
models, as in the models of Baumol-Tobin, Miller and Orr (1966), Constantinides (1976), among
others. In these papers the problem aims to minimize the steady state cost implied by a station-
ary inventory policy. This di®ers from our formulation, where the agent minimizes the expected
discounted cost in (9). In this regard our analysis follows the one of Constantinides and Richards
(1978). For a related model, Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980) compare the resulting money demand
arising from minimizing the steady state vs. the expected discounted cost.
11to derive equation (5). The only decision that the agent must make is whether
to remain unmatched, or to pay the ¯xed cost b and be matched with a ¯nancial
intermediary. Denoting by V 0 (m) the derivative of V (m) with respect to m, the
Bellman equation satis¯es
rV (m) = Rm + pmin
^ m¸0
(V (^ m) ¡ V (m)) + V
0 (m)(¡c ¡ m¼) : (10)
Regardless of how the agent ends up matched with a ¯nancial intermediary, she
chooses the optimal adjustment and sets m = m¤, or
V
¤ ´ V (m
¤) = min
^ m¸0
V (^ m) : (11)
As in problem (4) we will guess that the optimal policy is described by two
threshold values satisfying 0 < m¤ < m¤¤. This requires two boundary conditions.
At m = 0 the agent must pay the cost b and withdraw, and for m ¸ m¤¤ the agent
chooses to pay the cost b and deposit the cash in excess of m¤.8 Combining these
boundary conditions with (10) we have:
V (m) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
V ¤ + b if m = 0
Rm + pV ¤ ¡ V 0 (m)(c + m¼)
r + p
if m 2 (0;m¤¤)
V ¤ + b if m ¸ m¤¤
(12)
To ensure that it is optimal not to pay the cost and contact the intermediary in the
relevant range we require:
V (m) < V
¤ + b for m 2 (0;m
¤¤) : (13)
Summarizing, we say that m¤;m¤¤;V ¤, V (¢) solve the Bellman equation for the
shadow cost problem (9) if they satisfy (11)-(12)-(13). We are now ready to show
that, ¯rst, (4) and (9) are equivalent and, second, the existence and characterization
of the solution.
Proposition 1. Assume that the opportunity cost is given by R = r + ¼ + p2, and
that the contact rate with the ¯nancial intermediary is p = p1+p2. Assume that the
8Since withdrawals are the agent only source of cash in this economy, in the invariant distribution
of money holdings the threshold m¤¤ is never reached and all agents are distributed on the interval
(0;m¤).
12functions G(¢);V (¢) satisfy
G(m) = V (m) ¡ m + c=r + p2b=r (14)
for all m ¸ 0. Then, m¤;m¤¤; G(¢) solve the Bellman equation for the total cost
problem (4) if and only if m¤;m¤¤;V ¤; V (¢) solve the Bellman equation for the
shadow cost problem (9).
Proof. See Appendix A.
We brie°y comment on the relation between the total and shadow cost problems.
Notice that they are described by the same number of parameters. They have
r;¼;c;b in common, the total cost problem uses p1 and p2, while the shadow cost
problem uses R and p. That R = r + ¼ + p2 is quite intuitive: the shadow cost of
holding money is given by the real opportunity cost of investing, r, plus the fact
that cash holdings loose real value continually at a rate ¼ and they are lost entirely
with probability p2 per unit of time. Likewise that p = p1 + p2 is clear too: since
the e®ect of either shock is to force an adjustment on cash. The relation between
G and V in (14) is quite intuitive. First the constant c=r is required, since even
if withdrawals were free (say b = 0) consumption expenditures must be ¯nanced.
Second, the constant p2b=r is the present value of all the withdrawals cost that is
paid after cash is \lost". This adjustment is required because in the shadow cost
problem there is no theft. Third, the term m has to be subtracted from V since this
amount has already been withdrawn from the interest bearing account.
From now on, we use the shadow cost formulation, since it is closer to the
standard inventory decision problem. On the theoretical side, having the e®ect of
theft as part of the opportunity cost allows us to parameterize R as being, at least
conceptually, independent of r and ¼. On the quantitative side we think that, at
least for low nominal interest rates, the presence of other opportunity costs may be
important.
4.3 Characterization of the optimal return point m¤
The next proposition gives one non-linear equation whose unique solution determines
the cash replenishment value m¤ as a function of the model parameters: R; ¼; r; p; c
and b.
Proposition 2. Assume that r + ¼ + p > 0: The optimal return point m¤
c has three
arguments: ¯;r + p;¼, where ¯ ´ b
















Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that, keeping r and ¼ ¯xed, the solution for m¤=c is a function of b=(cR),
as it is in the steady state money demand of Section 3. This immediately implies
that m¤ is homogenous of degree one in (c;b). The next proposition gives a closed
form solution for the function V (¢), and the scalar V ¤ in terms of m¤:
Proposition 3. Assume that r + ¼ + p > 0: Let m¤ be the solution of (15).
(i) The value for the agents not matched with a ¯nancial institution, for m 2
(0;m¤¤), is given by the convex function:
V (m) =
·






























For m = 0 or m ¸ m¤¤ : V (m) = V ¤ + b:







Proof. See Appendix A.
The close relationship between the value function at zero cash and the optimal
return point V (0) = (R=r)m¤ + b derived in this proposition will be useful to
measure the gains of di®erent ¯nancial arrangements. The next proposition uses
the characterization of the solution for m¤ to conduct some comparative statics.
Proposition 4. The optimal return point m¤ has the following properties:
(i) m¤
c is increasing in b
cR, m¤
c = 0 as b
cR = 0 and m¤
c ! 1 as b
cR ! 1 .
(ii) For small b
cR, we can approximate m¤













where o(z)=z ! 0 as z ! 0:
(iii) Assuming that the Fisher equation holds, in that ¼ = R ¡ r, the elasticity of


























j¼=0 ! 1=2 as
^ b
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where ^ b ´ (p + r)
2 b=c.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The proposition shows that when b=(cR) is small the resulting money demand is
well approximated by the one for the BT model. Part (iv) shows that the absolute
value of the interest elasticity (when in°ation is zero) ranges between zero and 1/2,
and that it is decreasing in p. In the limits we use ^ b to write a comparative static
result for the interest elasticity of m¤ with respect to p. Indeed, for r = 0, we have
already given an economic interpretation to ^ b in Section 3, to which we will return
in Proposition 8. Since in Proposition 2 we show that m¤ is a function of b=(cR),
then the elasticity of m¤ with respect to b=c equals the one with respect to R with
an opposite sign.
4.4 Number of withdrawals and cash holdings distribution
This section derives the invariant distribution of real cash holdings when the policy
characterized by the parameters (m¤;p;c) is followed and the in°ation rate is ¼.
Throughout the section m¤ is treated as a parameter, so that the policy is to replen-
ish cash holdings up to the return value m¤, either when a match with a ¯nancial
intermediary occurs, which happens at a rate p per unit of time, or when the agent
runs out of money (i.e. real balances hit zero). Our ¯rst result is to compute the
expected number of withdrawals per unit of time, denoted by n. This includes both
the withdrawals that occur upon an exogenous contact with the ¯nancial interme-
diary and the ones initiated by the agent when her cash balances reach zero. By
the fundamental theorem of Renewal Theory n equals the reciprocal of the expected
time between withdrawals, which after straightforward calculations gives

















Proof. See Appendix A.
As can be seen from expression (18) the ratio n=p ¸ 1, since in addition to
the p free withdrawals it includes the costly withdrawals that agents do when they
exhaust their cash. Note how this formula yields exactly the expression in the BT
model when p = ¼ = 0. The next proposition derives the density of the invariant
distribution of real cash balances as a function of p;¼;c and m¤=c:















(ii) Let H (m;m¤
1) be the CDF of m for a given m¤: Let m¤
1 < m¤
2, then H (m;m¤
2) ·
H (m;m¤
1); i.e. H (¢;m¤
2) ¯rst order stochastically dominates H (¢;m¤
1).
Proof. See Appendix A.







for any m 2 (0;m¤). There are two forces determining the shape of this density.
One is that agents meet a ¯nancial intermediary at a rate p, where they replenish
their cash balances. The other is that in°ation eats away the real value of their
nominal balances. Notice that if p = ¼ these two e®ects cancel and the density is
constant. If p < ¼ the density is downward sloping, with more agents at low values
of real balances due to the greater pull of the in°ation e®ect. If p > ¼, the density
is upward sloping due the greater e®ect of the replenishing of cash balances. This
uses that ¼m+c > 0 in the support of h because ¼m¤ +c > 0 (see equation (37) in
Appendix A).
We de¯ne the average money demand as M =
R m¤
0 mh(m)dm. Using the ex-




























Next we analyze how M depends on m¤ and p. The function M
c (¢;¼;p) is increasing
in m¤, which follows immediately from part (ii) of Proposition 6: with a higher
target replenishment level the agents end up holding more money on average. The
next proposition shows that for a ¯xed m¤, M is increasing in p:
Proposition 7. The ratio M





for p = ¼ and
M
m¤(¼;p) ! 1 as p ! 1:
Proof. See Appendix A.
It is useful to compare this result with the corresponding one for the BT case,
which is obtained when ¼ = p = 0. In this case agents withdraw m¤ hence M=m¤ =
1=2. The other limit corresponds to the case where withdrawals happen so often
that at all times the average amount of money coincides with the amount just after
a withdrawal.














¤ ¡ m)h(m)dm : (22)
To understand the expression for W notice that (n¡p) is the number of withdrawals
in a unit of time that occur because the zero balance is reached, so if we divide it by
the total number of withdrawals per unit of time (n) we obtain the fraction of with-
drawals that occur at a zero balance. Each of these withdrawals is of size m¤. The
complementary fraction gives the withdrawals that occur due to a chance meeting
with the intermediary. A withdrawal of size m¤ ¡m happens with frequency h(m).
Inspection of (22) shows that W=c is a function of three arguments: m¤=c;¼;p.
Combining the previous results we can see that for p ¸ ¼, the ratio of withdrawals











Since M=m¤ ¸ 1=2, then it follows that W=M · 2. Indeed notice that for p
17large enough this ratio can be smaller than one. We mention this property because
for the Baumol - Tobin model the ratio W=M is exactly two, while in the data of
Table 1 for households with an ATM card the average ratio is below 1.5 and its
median value is 1. The intuition for this result in our model is clear: agents take
advantage of the free random withdrawals regardless of their cash balances, hence
the withdrawals are distributed on [0;m¤], as opposed to be concentrated on m¤, as
in the BT model.
We let M be the average amount of money that an agent has at the time of
withdrawal. A fraction [1 ¡ p=n] of the withdrawals happens when m = 0. For the
remaining fraction, p=n, an agent has money holdings at the time of the withdrawal










0 m h(m)dm . Inspec-
tion of this expression shows that M=c is a function of three arguments: m¤=c;¼;p.






The ratio M=M is a measure of the precautionary demand for cash: it is zero
only when p = 0, it goes to 1 as p ! 1 and, at least for ¼ = 0, it is increasing
in p. This is because as p increases the agent has more opportunities for a free
withdrawal, which directly increases M=M (see equations 18 and 24), and from part
(iii) in Proposition 4 the induced e®ect of p on m¤ cannot outweigh the direct e®ect.
Other researchers noticing that currency holdings are positive at the time of
withdrawals account for this feature by adding a constant M=M to the sawtooth
path of a deterministic inventory model, which implies that the average cash balance
is M1 = M + 0:5 c=n or M2 = M + 0:5 W. See e.g. equations (1) and (2) in
Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli (2002) and Table 1 in Porter and Judson (1996).
Instead, when we model the determinants of the precautionary holdings M=M in
a random setup, we ¯nd that W=2 < M < M + W=2. The leftmost inequality is
a consequence of Proposition 7 and equation (23), the other can be derived using
the form of the optimal decision rules and the law of motion of cash °ows (see
the Online Appendix C). The discussion above shows that the expressions for the
demand for cash proposed in the literature to deal with the precautionary motive
are upward biased. Using the data of Table 1 shows that both expressions M1 and
M2 overestimate the average amount of cash held by Italian households by a large
margin.9
9The expression for M1 overestimates the average cash by 20% and 140% for household with
184.5 Comparative statics on M, M, W and welfare
We begin with a comparative statics exercise on M, M and W in terms of the
primitive parameters b=c, p, and R. To do this we combine the results of Section
4.3, where we analyzed how the optimal decision rule m¤=c depends on p, b=c and
R, with the results of Section 4.4 where we analyze how M, M, and W change as
a function of m¤=c and p. The next proposition de¯nes a one dimensional index
^ b ´ (b=c)p2 that characterizes the shape of the money demand and the strength
of the precautionary motive focusing on ¼ = r = 0. When r ! 0 our problem is
equivalent to minimizing the steady state cost. The choice of ¼ = r = 0 simpli¯es
the comparison of the analytical results with the ones for the original BT model and
with the ones of Section 3.
Proposition 8. Let ¼ = 0 and r ! 0, the ratios: W=M, M=M and (M=c)p are






































Proof. See Appendix A.
The elasticity of (M=c)p with respect to ^ b=R determines the e®ect of the tech-
nological parameters b=c and p on the level of money demand, as well as on the








Direct computation gives that
@ log(M=c)
@ logp
= ¡1 + 2´(^ b=R) · 0 and 0 ·
@ log(M=c)
@ log(b=c)
= ´(^ b=R) : (26)
The previous sections showed that p has two opposing e®ects on M=c: for a given
m¤=c, the value of M=c increases with p, but the optimal choice of m¤=c decreases
with p. Proposition 8 and equation (26) show that the net e®ect is always negative.
For low values of ^ b=R, where ´ ¼ 1=2, the elasticity of M=c with respect to p
and without ATMs, respectively; the one for M2 by 7% and 40%, respectively.
19is close to zero and the one with respect to b=c is close to 1=2, which is the BT
case. For large values of ^ b=R, the elasticity of M=c with respect to p goes to ¡1,
and the one with respect to b=c goes to zero. Likewise, equation (26) implies that
@ logM=@ logc = 1 ¡ ´ and hence that the expenditure elasticity of the money
demand ranges between 1/2 (the BT value) and 1 as ^ b=R becomes large.
In the original BT model W=M = 2, M=M = 0 and
@ log(M=c)
@ logR = ¡1=2 for
all b=c and R. These are the values that correspond to our model as ^ b=R ! 0.
This limit includes the standard case where p ! 0, but it also includes the case
where b=c is much smaller than p2=R. As ^ b=R grows, our model predicts smaller
interest rate elasticity than the BT model, and in the limit, as ^ b=R ! 1, that the
elasticity goes to zero. This result is a smooth version of the one for the model
with p deterministic free withdrawal opportunities of Section 3. In that model the
elasticity @ log(Mp=c)=@ log(^ b=R) is a step function that takes two values, 1=2 for
low values of ^ b=R, and zero otherwise. The smoothness is a natural consequence of
the randomness on the free withdrawal opportunities. One key di®erence is that the
deterministic model of Section 3 has no precautionary motive for money demand,
hence W=M =2 and M=M = 0. Instead, as Proposition 8 shows, in the model with
random free withdrawal opportunities, the strength of the precautionary motive, as
measured by W=M and M=M, is a function of ^ b=R.
Figure 1 plots W=M, M=M and ´ as functions of ^ b=R. This ¯gure completely
characterizes the shape of the money demand and the strength of the precautionary
motive since the functions plotted in it depend only on ^ b=R. The range of the ^ b=R
values used in this ¯gure is chosen to span the variation of the estimates presented in
Table 6. While this ¯gure is based on results for ¼ = r = 0, the ¯gure obtained using
the values of ¼ and r that correspond to the averages for Italy during 1993-2004 is
quantitatively indistinguishable.
We conclude this section with a result on the welfare cost of in°ation and
the e®ect technological change. Let (R;·) be the vector of parameters that in-
dex the value function V (m;R;·) and the invariant distribution h(m;R;·), where
· = (¼; r; b; p; c). We de¯ne the average °ow cost of cash purchases borne
by households v(R;·) ´
R m¤
0 rV (m;R;·)h(m;R;·)dm. We measure the bene¯t of
lower in°ation for households, say as captured by a lower R and ¼, or of a better
technology, say as captured by a lower b=c or a higher p, by comparing v(¢) for the
corresponding values of (R;·). A related concept is `(R;·), the expected withdrawal
20Figure 1: W=M, M=M, m¤=M and ´ = elasticity of (M=c)p
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cost borne by households that follow the optimal rule
`(R;·) = [n(m
¤(R;·);p;¼) ¡ p] ¢ b (27)
where n is given in (18) and the expected number of free withdrawals, p, are sub-
tracted. The value of `(R;·) measures the resources wasted trying to economize on
cash balances, i.e. the deadweight loss for the society corresponding to R. While `
is the relevant measure of the cost for the society, we ¯nd useful to de¯ne v sepa-
rately to measure the consumers' bene¯t of using ATM cards. The next proposition
characterizes `(R;·) and v(R;·) as r ! 0. This limit is useful for comparison with
the BT model and it also turns out to be an excellent approximation for the values
of r that we use in our estimation.
Proposition 9. Let r ! 0: (i) v(R;·) = R m¤(R;·); (ii) v(R;·) =
R R
0 M( ~ R;·)d ~ R,
and (iii) `(R;·) = v(R;·) ¡ R M(R;·).
Proof. See Appendix A.
This proposition allows us to estimate the e®ect of in°ation or technology on agents'
welfare using data on W and M, since W + M = m¤. In the BT model ` = RM =
21p
Rbc=2 since m¤ = W = 2M. In our model m¤=M = W=M + M=M < 2, as
can be seen in Figure 1, thus using RM as an estimate of R(m¤ ¡ M) produces an
overestimate of the cost of in°ation `. For instance, for ^ b=R = 1:8, the BT welfare
cost measure overestimates the cost of in°ation by about 67%, since m¤=M » = 1:6.
Clearly the loss for society is smaller than the cost for households; using (i)-(iii)
and Figure 1 the two can be easily compared. As ^ b=R ranges from zero to 1, the
ratio of the costs `=v decreases from 1/2, the BT value, to zero. Not surprisingly
(ii)-(iii) implies that the loss for society coincides with the consumer surplus that can
be gained by reducing R to zero, i.e. `(R) =
R R
0 M( ~ R)d ~ R ¡ RM(R). This extends
the result of Lucas (2000), derived from a money-in-the-utility-function model, to an
explicit inventory-theoretic model. Measuring the welfare cost of in°ation using the
consumer surplus requires the estimation of the money demand for di®erent interest
rates, while the approach using (i) and (iii) can be done using information on M,
W and M. Section 7 presents an application of these results and a comparison with
the ones by Lucas (2000).10
5 Estimation of the model
We estimate the parameters (p;b=c) using the data described in Section 2 under two
alternative sets of assumptions. Our baseline assumptions are that all households in
the same cell (to be de¯ned below) have the same parameters (p;b=c). For this case
we discuss the identi¯cation of the parameters and the goodness of ¯t of the model.
Alternatively in Section 5.3 we assume that (p;b=c) are a simple parametric function
of individual household characteristics. In both cases we take the opportunity cost
R as observable (see Table 2), and assume that households values of (M=c;n;W=M,
M=M) are observed with classical normally distributed measurement error (in logs).
The assumption of classical measurement error is often used when estimating
models based on household survey data. We ¯nd that the pattern of violations
of a simple accounting identity, c = n W ¡ ¼M, is consistent with large classical
measurement error. In particular, a histogram of the deviations of this identity (in
log points) is centered around zero, symmetric, and roughly bell shaped (see the
Online Appendix J for more details).
Let us provide a complete list of the assumptions used in the baseline estimation.
We de¯ne a cell as a particular combination of year-province-household type, where
10In (ii)-(iii) we measure welfare and consumer surplus with respect to variations in R, keeping
¼ ¯xed. The e®ect on M and v of changes in ¼ for a constant R are quantitatively small.
22the latter is de¯ned by the cash expenditure third-tile and ATM ownership. This
yields about 3,700 cells, the product of the 103 provinces of Italy £ 6 time periods
(spanning 1993-2004) £ 2 ATM ownership status (whether a household has an
ATM card or not) £ 3 cash consumption third-tiles. For each year we observed
the in°ation rate ¼, and for each year-province-ATM ownership type we observed
the opportunity cost R. Let i index the households in a cell. For all households
in that cell we assume that bi=ci and pi are identical. Given the homogeneity of
the optimal decision rules, this implies that all household i have the same values of
M=c;W=M;n, M=M.
Let j = 1;2;3;4 index the variables M=c; W=M, n and M=M, let z
j
i be the (log
of the) i¡th household observation on variable j, and ³j (µ) the (log of the) model
prediction of the j variable for the parameter vector µ ´ (p;b=c). The variable
z
j
i is observed with a zero-mean measurement error "
j




i = ³j (µ) + "
j
i. It is assumed that the parameter ¾2
j is common across cells (we
allow one set of variances for households with ATM cards, and one for those without).
The estimation proceeds in two steps. We ¯rst estimate ¾2
j by regressing each
of the 4 observables, measured at the individual household level, on a vector of cell
dummies. The variance of the regression residual is our estimate of ¾2
j (there are
about 20,000 degrees of freedom for each estimate). Since the errors "
j
i are assumed
to be independent across households i and variables j, we estimate the vector of























j is the measurement error variance estimated above and Nj is the sample
size of the variable j.11 Minimizing F (for each cell) yields the maximum likelihood
estimator provided the "
j
i are independent across j for each i.
11The average number of observations (Nj) available for each variable varies. It is similar for
households with and without ATM cards. There are more observations on M=c than for each
of the other variables, and its average weight (N1=¾2
1) is about 1.5 times larger than each of the
other three weights (see the Online Appendix L8 for further documentation). The number of
households-year-type combinations used to construct all the cells is approximately 40;000.
235.1 Estimation and Identi¯cation
In this section we discuss the features of the data that identify our parameters.





. As a ¯rst step we
study how to select the parameters to match M=c and n only, as opposed to
(M=c;n;W=M;M=M). To simplify the exposition assume zero in°ation, ¼ = 0.
For the BT model, i.e. for p = 0, we have W = m¤; c = m¤ n and M = m¤=2
which implies 2 M=c = 1= n. Hence, if the data were generated by the BT model,
M=c and n would have to satisfy this relation. Now consider the average cash bal-
ances generated by a policy like the one of the model of Section 4. From (18) and











or, solving for M=c as a function of n :
M
c
















For a given p, the pairs M=c = » (n;p) and n are consistent with a cash management
policy of replenishing balances to some value m¤ either when the zero balance is
reached or when a chance meeting with an intermediary occurs. Notice ¯rst that
setting p = 0 in this equation we obtain BT, i.e. » (n;0) = (1=2)=n. Second, notice




@n2 > 0, and
@»
@p > 0. Consider plotting the target value of the data on
the (n; M=c) plane. For a given M=c, there is a minimum n that the model can
generate, namely the value (1=2)=(M=c). Given that @»=@p > 0, any value of n
smaller than the one implied by the BT model cannot be made consistent with our
model, regardless of the values for the rest of the parameters. By the same reason,
any value of n higher than (1=2)=(M=c) can be accommodated by an appropriate
choice of p: This is quite intuitive: relative to the BT model, our model can generate
a larger number of withdrawals for the same M=c if the agent meets an intermediary
often enough, i.e. if p is large enough. On the other hand there is a minimum number
of expected chance meetings, namely p = 0:
The previous discussion showed that p is identi¯ed. Speci¯cally, ¯x a province-
year-type of household combination, with its corresponding values for M=c and n.
Then, solving M=c = » (n;p ) for p gives an estimate of p. Taking this value of p, and
24those of M=c and n for this province-year-type combination, we use (29) to solve for
m¤=c. Finally, we ¯nd the value of ¯ ´ b=(cR) consistent with this replenishment





exp[(r + p) m¤=c] ¡ [1 + (r + p)(m¤=c)]
(r + p)
2 : (31)
To understand this expression consider two pairs (M=c;n), both on the locus de¯ned
by » (¢;p) for a given value of p. The pair with higher M=c and lower n corresponds
to a higher value of ¯. This is quite simple: agents will economize on trips to the
¯nancial intermediary if ¯ is high, i.e. if these trips are expensive relative to the
opportunity cost of cash. Hence, data on M=c and n identify p and ¯. Using data
on R for this province-year, we can estimate b=c.
Figure 2 plots the function » (¢;p) for several values of p, as well as the aver-
age value of M=c and n for all households of a given type (i.e. with and without
ATM cards) for each province-year in our data (to make the graph easier to read
we do not plot di®erent consumption cells for a given province-year-ATM owner-
ship). Notice that 46 percent of province-year pairs for households without an ATM
card are below the » (¢;0) line, so no parameters in our model can rationalize those
choices. The corresponding value for those with an ATM card is only 3.5 percent
of the pairs. The values of p required to rationalize the average choice for most
province-year pairs for those households without ATM cards are in the range p = 0
to p = 20. The corresponding range for those with ATM cards is between p = 5
and p = 60. Inspecting this ¯gure we can also see that the observations for house-
holds with ATM cards are to the south-east of those for households without ATM
cards. Equivalently, we can see that for the same value of p, the observations that
correspond to households with ATM tend to have lower values of ¯.
We now show that the pair of observables W=M and n also allows on to identify
the model structural parameters. As in the previous case, consider an agent that
follows an arbitrary policy of replenishing her cash to a return level m¤, either as
her cash balances hit zero, or at the time of chance meeting with the intermediary.
















25Figure 2: Theory vs. data (province-year mean): M=c;n
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n:     number of withdrawals per year (in logs)
p = 0
Baumol−Tobin
p = 5 p = 10 p = 20 p = 35 p = 60
for n ¸ p, and p ¸ 0. Some algebra shows that







Notice that the ratio W=M is a function only of the ratio p=n. The interpretation of
this is clear: for p = 0 we have W=M = 2, as in the BT model. This is the highest
value that can be achieved by the ratio W=M. As p increases for a ¯xed n, the
replenishing level of cash m¤=c must be smaller, and hence the average withdrawal
becomes smaller relative the average cash holdings M=c. Indeed, as n converges to
p ¡a case where almost all the withdrawals are due to chance meetings with the
intermediary¡, then W=M goes to zero. As in the previous case, given a pair of
observations on W=M and n, we can use ± to solve for the corresponding p. Then,
using the values of (W=M p;n) we can ¯nd a value of (b=c)=R to rationalize the
choice of W=M. To see how, notice that given W=M; M=c, and p=n, we can ¯nd





n (equation 23). With the values of (m¤=c; p)
we can ¯nd the unique value of ¯ = (b=c)=R that rationalizes this choice, using
(31). Thus, data on W=M and n identi¯es p. The implied values of p needed to
26rationalize these data are similar to the ones found using the information of M=c
and n displayed in Figure 2.
Finally notice that the ratio M=M can also be used to identify the model struc-
tural parameters. In (24) we have derived that p = n (M=M). We use this
equation as a way to estimate p. If M is zero, then p must be zero. Hence the fact
that M=M > 0, documented in Table 1, is an indication that our model requires
p > 0: We can readily use this equation to estimate p since we have data on both n
and (M=M). According to this formula a large value of p is consistent with either
a large ratio of cash at withdrawals, M=M, or a large number of withdrawals, n.
Also, for a ¯xed p, di®erent combinations of n and M=M that give the same product
are due to di®erences in ¯ = (b=c)=R. If ¯ is high, then agents economize on the
number of withdrawals and keep larger cash balances (see the Online Appendix L9
for more documentation).
We have discussed how data on any of the pairs (M=c;n), (W=M;n) or (M=M;n)
identify p and ¯. Of course, if the data had been generated by the model, the three
ways of estimating (p; ¯) would produce identical estimates. In other words, the
model is overidenti¯ed. We will use this idea to report how well the model ¯ts the
data or, more formally, to test for the overidentifying restrictions in the next section.
Considering the case of ¼ > 0 makes the expressions more complex, but, at least
qualitatively, does not change any of the properties discussed above. Moreover, since
the in°ation rate in our data set is quite low the expressions for ¼ = 0 approximate
the relevant range for ¼ > 0 very well.
5.2 Estimation results
We estimate the model for each province-year-type of household and report statistics
of the estimates in Table 3. For each year we use the in°ation rate corresponding
to the Italian CPI for all provinces and ¯x the real return r to be 2% per year.
The ¯rst two panels in the table report the mean, median, 95th and 5th percentile
of the estimated values for p and b=c across all province-year. As explained above,
our procedure estimates ¯ ´ b
c R, so to obtain b=c we compute the opportunity cost
R as the sum of the nominal interest rate and the probability of cash being stolen
described in Table 2. The parameter p gives the average number of free withdrawals
opportunities per year. The parameter b=c ¢ 100 is the cost of a withdrawal in
percentage of the daily cash-expenditure. We also report the mean value of the t
statistics for these parameters. The asymptotic standard errors are computed by
27solving for the information matrix.
Table 3: Summary of (p;b=c) estimates across province-year-types
Household w/o ATM Household w. ATM
Cash expenditurea: Low High Low High
Parameter p
Mean 6.8 8.7 20 25
Median 5.6 6.2 17 20
95thpercentile 17 25 49 61
5th percentile 1.1 0.8 3 4
Mean t-stat 2.5 2.2 2.7 3.5
Parameter b=c (in % of daily cash expenditure)
Mean 10.5 5.5 6.5 2.1
Median 7.3 3.6 3.5 1.1
95th percentile 30 17 24 7
5th percentile 1.5 0.4 0.6 0.3
Mean t-stat 2.8 2.5 2.4 3.3
# prov-year-type estimates 504 505 525 569
Goodness of ¯t: Likelihood Criterion F(µ;x) » Â2
% province-years-type where:
- F(µ;x) < 4:6b 64% 57%
# prov-year-type estimates 1,539 1,654
Avg. # of households per estimate 10.7 13.5
Notes: - a Low (high) denotes the lowest (highest) third of households ranked by cash expenditure
c. - b Percentage of province-year-type estimates where the overidentifying restriction test is not
rejected at the 10 per cent con¯dence level.
The results reported in the ¯rst two columns of the table concern households
who posses an ATM card, shown separately for those in the lowest and highest
cash expenditure levels. The corresponding statistics for households without ATM
card appear in the third and fourth columns. The results in this table con¯rm the
graphical analysis of ¯gure 2 discussed above: the median estimates of p are just
where one would locate them by the ¯gures. The di®erence between the 95th and the
5th percentiles indicates that there is a tremendous amount of heterogeneity across
province-years. The relatively low values for the mean t-statistics re°ect the fact
that the number of households used in each estimation cell is small. Indeed, in the
Online Appendix I we consider di®erent levels of aggregation and data selection. In
all the cases considered we ¯nd very similar values for the average of the parameters
p and b=c, and we ¯nd that when we do not disaggregate the data so much the
28average t-stats increase roughly with the (square root) of the average number of
observations per cell.12
Table 3 shows that the average value of b=c across all province-year-type is be-
tween 2 and 10 per cent of daily cash consumption. Fixing an ATM ownership type,
and comparing the average estimates for p and b=c across cash consumption cells
we see that there are small di®erences for p, but that b=c is substantially smaller for
the those in the highest cash consumption cell. Indeed, combining this information
with the level of cash consumption that corresponds to each cell we estimate b to
be uncorrelated with cash consumption levels, as documented in Section 6. Using
information from Table 1 for the corresponding cash expenditure to which these per-
centages refer, the mean values of b for households with and without ATM are 0.8
and 1.7 euros at year 2004 prices, respectively. For comparison, the cash withdrawal
charge for own-bank transactions was zero, while the average charge for other-bank
transactions, which account for less than 20 % of the total, was 2.0 euros.13
Next we discuss three di®erent types of evidence that indicate a successful em-
pirical performance of the model. First, Table 3 shows that households with ATM
cards have a higher mean and median value of p and correspondingly lower values
of b=c. The comparison of the (p;b=c) estimates across province-year-consumption
cells shows that 88 percent of the estimated values of p are higher for households
with ATM, and for 82 percent of the estimated values of b=c are lower. Also, there
is evidence of an e®ect at the level of the province-year-consumption cell, since we
¯nd that the correlation between the estimated values of b=c for households with
and without ATM across province-year-consumption cell is 0:69. The same statis-
tic for p is 0:3. These patterns are consistent with the hypothesis that households
with ATM cards have access to a more e±cient transactions system, and that the
e±ciency of the transaction technology in a given province-year-consumption cell
is correlated for both ATM and non-ATM adopters. We ¯nd this result reassuring
since we have estimated the model for ATM holders and non-holders and for each
province-year-consumption cell separately.
Second, in the third panel of Table 3 we report statistics on the goodness of ¯t
of the model. For each province-year-type cell, under the assumption of normally
12Concerning aggregation, we repeat all the estimates without disaggregating by the level of
cash consumption, so that Nj is three times larger. Concerning data selection, we repeat all the
estimates excluding those observations where the cash holding identity is violated by more than
200% or where the share of total income received in cash by the household exceeds 50%. The
goal of this data selection, that roughly halves the sample size, is to explore the robustness of the
estimates to measurement error.
13The sources are Retail Banking Research (2005) and an internal report by the Bank of Italy.
29distributed errors, or as an asymptotic result, the minimized likelihood criterion is
distributed as a Â2
(2). According to the statistic reported in the ¯rst line of this
panel, in more than half of the province-years-consumption cells the minimized like-
lihood criterion is smaller than the critical value corresponding to a 10% probability
con¯dence level.
Table 4: Correlations between (p; b
c;V (0)) estimates and ¯nancial di®usion indices
Household with ATM
p b=c V (0)
Bank-branch per 1,000 head 0.08 -0.19 -0.18
ATM per 1,000 head 0.10 -0.27 -0.27
Household with No ATM
p b=c V (0)
Bank-branch per 1,000 head 0.00a -0.26 -0.20
Notes: All variables are measured in logs. The sample size is 1,654 for HH w. ATM and
1,539 for HH without ATM. P-values for the null Hp. of a zero coe±cient (not reported),
computed assuming that the estimates are independent, are smaller than 1 per cent with
the exception of the one denoted by a.
Third, in Table 4 we compute correlations of the estimates of the technological
parameters p, b=c and the cost of ¯nancing cash purchases V (0) with indicators
that measure the density of ¯nancial intermediaries: bank branches and ATMs per
resident that vary across province and years. A greater ¯nancial di®usion raises
the chances of a free withdrawal opportunity (p)and reduces the cost of contacting
an intermediary (b=c). Hence we expect V (0) to be negatively correlated with the
di®usion measure. We ¯nd that the estimates of b=c and V (0) are negatively corre-
lated with these measures, and that the estimated p are positively correlated, though
the latter correlation is smaller. This ¯nding is reassuring since the indicators of
¯nancial di®usion were not used in the estimation of (p;b=c).
5.3 Estimates using individual household data
This section explores an alternative estimation strategy based on individual house-
hold observations. It is assumed that the four variables (M=c, W=M, n, M=M)
are observed with classical measurement error, and that the parameters b=c and p
di®er for each households, and are given by a simple function of household level
variables. In particular, let Xi be a k dimensional vector containing the value of
households i covariates. We assume that for each household i the values of b=c and




and pi = exp(¸p ¢ Xi), where ¸p are ¸b=c
are the parameters to be estimated. The vector Xi contains k = 8 covariates: a
constant, calendar year, the household cash expenditure (in logs), an ATM dummy,
a measure of the ¯nancial di®usion of Bank Branches and ATM terminals at the
province level, a credit card dummy, the income level per adult (in logs), and the
household size.
Assuming that the measurement error is independent across households and















where, as above, z
j
i is the log of the j-th observable for household i, ³j(µ) is the
model solution given the parameters µ and N is the number of households in the
sample.14 The estimation proceeds in two steps. We ¯rst estimate ¾2
j for each of the
4 variables by running a regression at the household level of each of the 4 variables
against the household level Xi. We then minimize the likelihood criterion F taking
the estimated ^ ¾2
j as given. The asymptotic standard errors of ¸ are computed by
inverting the information matrix.
Table 5 presents the estimates of ¸. The ¯rst column displays the point estimates
of ¸p and the fourth the point estimates for ¸b=c. The number in parenthesis next
to the point estimates are the corresponding t-stats. To compare the results with
the benchmark estimates of Section 5.2 the table also includes the coe±cients of
two regressions, under the labels ¹ ¸p and ¹ ¸b=c. The dependent variables of these
regression are the benchmark estimates of p and b=c, and hence they are the same for
all households in a cell ¡i.e. combination of a year, province, ATM card ownership,
and third-tile cash consumption¡, the right hand side variables are the cell-means
of the Xi covariates.
We now discuss the estimation results. The estimates of p and b=c that corre-
spond to a household with the average values of each of the Xi variables and our
estimated parameters ¸p and ¸b=c are, respectively, 11 and 5.2 percent. These two
values are similar to the estimates reported in Table 3 (in particular they are close
14Notice that we treat the opportunity cost Ri as known. To speed up the calculations we
estimate the model assuming that in°ation is zero. Based on the results for our benchmark case
we think this will have at most a very minor e®ect on the estimates. We also restrict the sample
to households that have information for all the 4 variables of interest, this gives us a sample of
about N = 17;000 (as opposed to 40,000 in our benchmark estimates).
31Table 5: Household level (p;b=c) estimates
Xi covariates ¸p t-stat ¹ ¸p ¸b=c t-stat ¹ ¸b=c
constant -87.7 (-1,370) -87.7 225 (3,340) 217
year 0.04 (0.67) 0.04 -0.11 (-1.64) -0.11
log cash expenditure 0.04 (0.03) -0.01 -0.96 (-0.62) -0.97
ATM dummy 1.24 (64.70) 1.28 -0.66 (-32.7) -0.75
log ATM and BB density -0.15 (-1.30) -0.16 -0.37 (-2.8) -0.34
credit card dummy 0.30 (2.96) 0.21 -0.01 ( -0.05 ) 0.08
log income 0.25 (4.18) 0.30 0.26 (4.05) 0.33
log HH size 0.35 (4.05) 0.28 0.26 (2.74) 0.27





exp(¸pXi). Xi is at the household level and (M=c, W=M, n, M=M) measured with error.
to the median across cells). The mean estimate for p, greater than zero, supports
the introduction of this dimension of the technology, as opposed to having only the
BT parameter b=c. The estimates of both ATM dummies are economically impor-
tant, and statistically signi¯cant. Households with an ATM card are estimated to
have a value of p approximately three times bigger (exp(1:24) ¼ 3:46) and a value
of b=c about half (exp(¡0:66) ¼ 0:52) relative to households without ATM cards.
There is a small positive time trend on p and a larger negative time trend on b=c,
although neither estimate is statistically signi¯cant. The value of b=c is smaller in
locations with higher density of ATM or Bank Branches with an elasticity of ¡0:37
borderline statistically signi¯cant, but this measure has a small negative e®ect on
p.15 The credit card dummy estimates suggest that the credit card has no e®ect on
b=c and a small positive borderline signi¯cant e®ect on p. A possible interpretation
for the e®ect on p is that households with a credit card have a better access to
¯nancial intermediaries. We ¯nd a positive e®ect of the log of the household size
(number of adults) in both p and b=c. This result is hard to interpret. If the with-
drawal technology available to a households, summarized by (p;b=c), had increasing
(decreasing) returns with respect to household size, we would have expected the p
and b=c to vary in opposite way as the household size changed. The coe±cient of
cash consumption indicates a small e®ect on p and an elasticity with respect to b=c
of almost negative one (¡0:96), although it is imprecisely estimated (this elasticity
15Table 4 showed a positive, albeit small, correlation.
32is very close to the one estimated using cell level aggregated data). The income per
adult has a positive elasticity of about 0.25 for both p and b=c. We interpret the
e®ect of income per capita on p as re°ecting better access to ¯nancial intermedi-
aries, and with respect to b=c as measuring a higher opportunity cost of time. The
combination of the e®ects of income per capita and cash expenditures yields the
following important corollary: the value of b is estimated to be independent of the
level of cash expenditure of the household, implying a cash expenditure elasticity of
money demand approximately of one half provided that the opportunity cost of time
is the same.
We conclude by discussing a goodness of ¯t statistics. The value of the minimized
likelihood criterion is F = 62;804, which equals half of the log-likelihood minus a
constant not involving ¸. Under the assumption of independent measurement error
F is distributed as a Â2 with N £ 4 ¡ 2 £ k = 54;260 degrees of freedom in a large
sample.16 The minimized value for F re°ects a relatively bad ¯t of the model. A
Â2 distribution with 54;260 degrees of freedom gives essentially zero probability of
obtain such a large value. This is to be compared with the model estimated using
cell aggregated data, which passed the over-identifying restrictions test for more
than half of the cells (see Table 3).
6 Implications for money demand
In this section we study the implications of our ¯ndings for the time patterns of
technology and for the expenditure and interest elasticity of the demand for currency.
We begin by documenting the trends in the withdrawal technology, as measured
by our estimates of p and b=c. Table 6 shows that p has approximately doubled, and
that (b=c) has approximately halved over the sample period. In words, our point
estimates indicate that the withdrawal technology has improved through time.17 The
table also reports ^ b=R ´ (b=c)p2=R, which as shown in Proposition 8 and illustrated
in Figure 1 determines the elasticity of the money demand and the strength of the
precautionary motive. In particular, the proposition implies that W=M and M=M
depend only on ^ b=R. The upward trend in the estimates of ^ b=R, which is mostly
a re°ection of the downward trend in the data for W=M, implies that the interest
rate elasticity of the money demand has decreased through time.
16We estimate k loadings ¸b=c and k loadings ¸p using N households with 4 observations each.
17Since we have only 6 time periods, the time trend are imprecisely estimated, as it can be seen
from the t-stats corresponding to years in Table 5
33Table 6: Time series pattern of estimated model parameters
1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 All years
Households with ATM
p 17 16 20 24 22 33 22
b=c £ 100 6.6 5.7 2.8 3.1 2.8 3.5 4.0
^ b=R 1.1 1.4 1.9 5.6 3.0 5.8 3.2
Households without ATM
p 6 5 8 9 8 12 8
b=c £ 100 13 12 6.2 4.9 4.5 5.7 7.7
^ b=R 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.6 0.5
R £ 100 8.5 7.3 4.3 3.9 3.2 2.9 5.0
R and p are annual rates, c is the daily cash expenditure rate, and for each province-year-
type ^ b=R = b¢p2=(365¢c¢R), which has no time dimension. Entries in the table are sample
means across province-type in a year.
By Proposition 8, the interest rate elasticity ´(^ b=R) implied by those estimates is
smaller than 1/2, the BT value. Using the mean of ^ b=R reported in the last column
of Table 6 to evaluate the function ´ in Figure 1 yields values for the elasticity equal
to 0.43 and 0.48 for households with and without ATM card, respectively. Even for
the largest values of ^ b=R recorded in Table 6, the value of ´ remains above 0.4. In
fact, further extending the range of Figure 1 it can be shown that values of ^ b=R
close to 100 are required to obtain an elasticity ´ smaller than 0.25. For such high
values of ^ b=R, the model implies M=M of about 0.99 and W=M below 0.3, values
re°ecting much stronger precautionary demand for money than those observed for
most Italian households. On the other hand, studies using cross sectional household
data, such as Lippi and Secchi (2007) for Italian data, and Daniels and Murphy
(1994) using US data, report interest rate elasticities smaller than 0.25.
A possible explanation for the di®erence in the estimated elasticities is that the
cross sectional regressions in the studies mentioned above fail to include adequate
measures of ¯nancial innovations, and hence the estimate of the interest rate elas-
ticity is biased towards zero. To make this clear, in Table 7 we estimate the interest
elasticity of M=c by running two regressions for each household type where M=c is
the model ¯tted value for each province-year-consumption type. The ¯rst regression
includes the log of p, b=c and R. According to Proposition 8, (M=c) p has elasticity
34´(^ b=R) so that we approximate it using a constant elasticity:
logM=c = ¡logp + ´( log(b=c) + 2log(p) ) ¡ ´ log(R) : (33)
The regression coe±cient for ´ estimated from (33) gives virtually the same value
obtained from Figure 1. Since the left hand side of the equation uses the values
of M=c produced by the model using the estimated p;b=c and no measurement
error, the only reason why the regression R2 does not equal one is that we are
approximating a non-linear function with a linear one. Yet the R2 is pretty close
to one because the elasticity, for this range of parameters, is close to constant. To
estimate the size of the bias due to the omission of the variables log p and logb=c, the
second regression includes only logR. The regression coe±cient for logR is an order
of magnitude smaller than the value of ´, pointing to a large omitted variable bias:
the correlation between (log(b=c)+2log(p)) and logR is 0.12 and 0.17 for households
with and without ATM card, respectively. Interestingly, the regression coe±cients
on logR estimated by omitting the log of p and b=c are similar to the values that
are reported in the literature mentioned above. Replicating the regressions of Table
7 using the actual, as opposed to the ¯tted, value of M=c as a dependent variable
yields very similar results (not reported here).
Table 7: A laboratory experiment on the interest elasticity of money demand
Dependent variable: log(M=c) Household w. ATM Household w/o ATM
log(p) -0.05 - -0.01 -
log(b=c) 0.45 - 0.48 -
log(R) -0.44 -0.07 -0.48 -0.04
R2 0.985 0.01 0.996 0.004
# observations (cells) 1,654 1,654 1,539 1,539
Notes: All regressions include a constant.
We now estimate the expenditure elasticity of the money demand. An advantage
of our data is that we use direct measures of cash expenditures (as opposed to income
or wealth).18 By Proposition 8, the expenditure elasticity is
@ logM
@ logc




For instance, if the ratio b=c is constant across values of c then the elasticity is one;
18Dotsey (1988) argues for the use of cash expenditure as the appropriate scale variable.
35alternatively, if b=c decreases proportionately with c the elasticity is 1 ¡ ´. Using
the variation of the estimated b=c across time, locations and household groups with
di®erent values of c, we estimate the elasticity of b=c with respect to c equal to
¡0:82 and ¡1:01 for households without and with ATM card, respectively. Using the
estimates for ´ we obtain that the mean expenditure elasticity is 1+0:48£(¡0:82) =
0:61 for households without ATM, and 0.56 for those with.
7 Cost of in°ation and Bene¯ts of ATM card
We use the estimates of (p; b
c) to quantify the deadweight loss for the society and the
cost for households of ¯nancing cash purchases and to discuss the bene¯ts of ATM
card ownership. In Section 4.5 we showed that the loss is ` = R(m¤ ¡ M) and the
household cost is v = Rm¤. In the ¯rst panel of Table 8 we display the average of `
and of `=c for each year. In 1993 the loss is 24 euros or 0.99 days of cash purchases.
Table 8: Deadweight loss ` and household cost v of cash purchases
1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 mean
` (2004 euros, per household) 24 23 11 11 10 10 15
`=c (in days of cash purchases) 0.99 0.85 0.46 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.59
`=c under 1993 technology 0.99 0.90 0.72 0.71 0.67 0.66 0.78
v (2004 euros, per household) 51 49 25 25 22 25 33
v=c : avg. group / avg. all groups w. ATM w/o ATM
- high c (top third ranked by c) 0.61 1.00
- low c (bottom third ranked by c) 1.11 1.48
Note: ` and v are averages weighted by the number of household type, and measured as
annual °ows. The average value of v=c across all groups is 1.31 days of cash purchases.
To put this quantity in perspective we relate it to the one in Lucas (2000), obtained
by ¯tting a log-log money demand with an interest elasticity of 1=2, which corre-
sponds to the BT model. Figure 5 in his paper plots the welfare cost of in°ation,
denoted by w (and de¯ned as our `), which for an opportunity cost R of 5%, is about
1:1% of US GDP. At the same R our deadweight loss ` is about 14 times smaller,
or 0:08% of the annual income for Italian households y (c ¢ 365 accounts for about
half of annual Italian GDP, `=y = 0:59=(2 ¢ 365) » = 0:08%). There are two reasons
for this di®erence. The ¯rst is that for a given cost R and money demand M=c, the
deadweight loss in our model is smaller than in BT (see Section 4.5). For instance
36for R = 0:05 and ^ b=R = 1:8, which is about our sample average, w=` is about 1:6.
The second is that the welfare cost is proportional to the level of the money demand:
multiplying M=y by a constant, multiplies `=y by the same constant. In particular,
Lucas ¯ts US data with a much higher value of M=y than the one we use for Italy:
0.225 versus 0.026 at R = 0:05. This is because while we focus on currency held by
households, he uses the stock of M1, an aggregate much larger than ours (including
cash holdings of non-residents and ¯rms).19
Table 8 also shows that by the end of the sample the welfare loss is about
40% smaller than its initial value. The reduction is explained by decreases in the
opportunity cost R and by advances in the withdrawal technology, i.e. decreases in
b=c and increases in p. To account for the contribution of these two determinants
on the reduction of the deadweight loss we compute a counterfactual. For each
province-type of household we freeze the values of p and b=c at those estimated for
1993, and compute `=c for the opportunity cost R and in°ation rates ¼ corresponding
to the subsequent years. We interpret the di®erence between the value of `=c in 1993
and the value corresponding to subsequent years as the increase in welfare due to
the Italian disin°ation. We ¯nd that the contributions of the disin°ation and of
technological change to the reduction in the welfare loss are of similar magnitude
(see the Online Appendix L10 for details).
The bottom panel of Table 8 examines the cross section variation in the cost v=c.
Comparing the values across columns shows that the cost is lower for households
with ATM cards, re°ecting their access to a better technology. Comparing the values
across rows shows that the cost is lower for households with higher consumption
purchases c, re°ecting that our estimates of b=c are uncorrelated with c.
We use v=c to quantify the bene¯ts associated to the ownership of the ATM card.
Under the maintained assumption that b is proportional to consumption within each
year-province-consumption group type, the value of the bene¯t for an agent without







where the 1/0 subscript indicates ownership (lack of) ATM card. The bene¯t is thus
computed assuming that the only characteristic that changes when comparing costs
is ATM ownership (i.e. c is kept constant).20 Table 9 shows that the mean bene¯t
of ATM card ownership ranges between 15 and 30 euros per year in the early sample
19Hence the 14-fold di®erence in `=y is given by the product of the factor 1.6 (the welfare cost
ratio for a given level of money demand), and the factor 8.6 (the ratio of money demand levels).
20The consumption third-tiles were constructed without conditioning on whether the household
owned an ATM card. It turns out that the di®erence in c between households with and without
ATM is very small (on average 4 per cent).
37and that it is smaller, between 4 and 13 euros, in 2004. The population weighted
average of the bene¯ts across all years and types is 17 euros (not reported in the
table). The downward trend in the bene¯ts is due to both the disin°ation and the
improvements in the technology, as discussed above. Table 9 also shows that the
bene¯t is higher for household in the top third of the distribution of cash expenditure.
This mainly re°ects the di®erent level of c of this group, since the bene¯t per unit
of c is roughly independent of its level. The bottom panel of Table 9 shows that
the bene¯t associated to ATM ownership is estimated to be positive for over 91%
of the province-year-type estimates. Two statistical tests are presented: the null
hypothesis that the gain is positive cannot be rejected (at the 10% con¯dence level)
in 99.5% of our estimates. Conversely, we are able to reject the null hypothesis
that the bene¯t is negative in about 64% of the cases. Since our estimates of
the parameters for households with and without ATM are done independently, we
think that the ¯nding that the estimated bene¯t is positive for most province-years
provides additional support for the model.
Table 9: Annual bene¯t of ATM ownership (in euros at 2004 prices)
1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004
Top third of households ranked by c
Mean across province years 29 35 17 15 13 13
Bottom third of households ranked by c
Mean across province years 17 14 6.6 5.5 3.6 4.4
Point estimate bene¯t > 0 Ho: bene¯t > 0 Ho: bene¯t < 0
91% of cells rejected 0.5% of cells rejected 64% of cells
Note: The con¯dence level for the test of hypothesis is 10%. The test is run on each of
about 1,500 cells.
Two caveats are noteworthy about the above counterfactual exercise. First,
the estimated bene¯t assumes that within a given province-year-consumption group
households without ATM card di®er from those with a card only in terms of the
withdrawal technology that is available to them (p;b=c). In future work we plan to
study the household choice of whether or not to have an ATM card, which will be
informative on the size of the estimates' bias. The second caveat is that ATM cards
provide other bene¯ts, such as access to banking information and electronic funds
transfers for retail transactions (EFTPOS payments), where the latter is important
in Italy. In spite of these caveats, our estimates of the annual bene¯t of ATM card
ownership are close to annual cardholder fees for debit cards, which vary from 10
38to 18 euros for most Italian banks over 2001-2005 (see page 35 and Figure 3.8.2 in
Retail Banking Research Ltd., 2005).
8 Conclusions
This paper proposes a simple, tightly parametrized, extension of the classic Baumol-
Tobin model to capture important empirical regularities that characterize the house-
holds' cash management. We now discuss some extensions of the model that we plan
to develop fully in future.
Our model has some unrealistic features: all random withdrawals are free, and all
the cash expenditures are deterministic. Two variations of our model that address
these issues are sketched below. The ¯rst one introduces an additional parameter, f,
denoting a ¯xed cost for withdrawals upon the random contacts with the ¯nancial
intermediary. The motivation for this is that when random withdrawals are free
the model has the unrealistic feature that agents withdraw every time they match
with an intermediary, making several withdrawals of extremely small size. Instead
the model with 0 < f < b has a strictly positive minimum withdrawal size. In the
Online Appendix F we use a likelihood ratio test to compare the ¯t of the f > 0
model with our benchmark f = 0 model. It is shown that the ¯t does not improve
much. Additionally, we show that the parameter f is nearly not identi¯ed. To
understand the intuition behind this result notice that the BT model is obtained for
p = 0, f = 0 and b > 0 or, equivalently, for f = b > 0 and p > 0. More data would
be needed to estimate f > 0, such as information on the minimum withdrawal size.
We left this exploration for future work.
The second variation explores the consequences of assuming that the cash ex-
penditure has a random component. One interesting result of this model is that
it may produce W=M ¸ 2, or equivalently M < E(c)=2n, where E(c) stands for
expected cash consumption per unit of time. These inequalities are indeed observed
for a small number of households, especially those without ATM cards (see Table
1 and Figure 2). However, this model is less tractable than our benchmark model,
and it is inconsistent with the large number of withdrawals, and the values of W=M,
that characterize the behavior of most households in the sample. Although in the
Online Appendices D and E we solved for the dynamic programming problem for
both variations, as well as for the implied distribution of the statistics for cash bal-
ances and withdrawals, we do not develop them further here to keep the discussion
as simple as possible. Moreover, as brie°y discussed, while the models incorporate
39some realistic features of cash management, they deliver only a modest improvement
on the ¯t of the statistics that we focus on in this paper.
Our model, as well as the BT model, takes as given the household cash expen-
diture. We think that our model should work well as an input for a cash-credit
model and view the modeling of this choice as an important extension left for future
work. Additionally, new household level data sets with information on cash man-
agement similar to the one we have used, as well as detailed diary information on
how di®erent purchases were paid (cash, credit card, check, etc.) will allow careful
quantitative work in this area.21
21One such dataset is developed by the Austrian National Bank and was used, for instance, by
Stix (2004) and Mooslechner, Stix and Wagner (2006).
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42Appendix
A Proofs for the model with free withdrawals
Proof of Proposition 1. Given two functions G; V satisfying (14) it is immediate
to verify that the boundary conditions of the two systems at m = 0 and m ¸ m¤¤




V (^ m) = argmin
^ m¸0
^ m + G(^ m):
It only remains to be shown that the Bellman equations are equivalent for m 2
(0;m¤¤). Using (14) we compute G0 (m) = V 0 (m)¡1. Assume that G(¢) solves the
Bellman equation (7) in this range, inserting (14) and its derivative into (7) gives
[r + p1 + p2]V (m) = V
0 (m)(¡c ¡ ¼m) + [p1 + p2]V (m
¤) + [r + p2 + ¼]m
Using R = r + ¼ + p2 and p = p1 + p2 we obtain the desired result, i.e. (12). The
proof that if V solves the Bellman equation for m 2 (0;m¤¤) so does G de¯ned as
in (14) follows from analogue steps.
Proof of Proposition 2. To solve for V ¤; m¤; m¤¤ and V (¢) satisfying (11)
and (12) we proceed as follows. Lemma 1 solves for V (A;V ¤), Lemma 2 gives
A(V ¤). Lemma 3 shows that V (¢) is convex for any V ¤ > 0. Lemma 4 solves for
m¤ using that, since V is convex, m¤ must satisfy V 0 (m¤) = 0. Finally, Lemma 5
gives V ¤ = V (m¤):
Lemmas 2, 4 and 5 yield a system of 3 equations in the 3 unknowns A;m¤;V ¤:
A =





+ (r + p)
2 b
























Replacing equation (36) into (35) yields one equation for A. Rearranging equation
(37) we obtain another equation for A. Equating these expressions for A, collecting
terms and rearranging yields equation (15) in the main text (which determines m¤).











where the function f denotes the left hand side and g the right
hand side. For r+p+¼ > 0, straightforward analysis shows that the solution exists
and is unique.
Lemma 1. Let V ¤ be an arbitrary value. The di®erential equation in (10) for
m 2 (0;m¤¤) is solved by the expression given in (16).
43Proof of Lemma 1. Follows by di®erentiation.
Lemma 2. Let V ¤ be an arbitrary non negative value. Let A be the constant that
solves the ODE in Lemma 1. Imposing that this solution satis¯es V (0) = V ¤ + b
the constant A is given by the expression in (35).
Proof of lemma 2. It follows using the expression in (16) to evaluate V (0).
Lemma 3. Let V ¤ be an arbitrary value. The solution of V given in Lemma 1,
with the value of A given in Lemma 2 is a convex function of m:




















since, as shown in Lemma 2, A > 0.
Lemma 4. Let A be an arbitrary value for the constant that indexes the solution
of the ODE for V in Lemma 1, given by (16). The value m¤ that solves V 0 (m¤) = 0
is given by the expression in (37).
Proof of Lemma 4. Follows using simple algebra.
Lemma 5. The value of V ¤ is V ¤ = R
r m¤
Proof of Lemma 5. Recall that at m = m¤ we have V 0 (m¤) = 0 and
V (m¤) = V ¤. Replacing these values in the Bellman equation (10) evaluated at
m = m¤ yields rV ¤ = Rm¤.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) The function V (¢) is derived in Lemma 1, the
expression for A in Lemma 2. (ii) The solution for V ¤ comes from Lemma 5.
Proof of Proposition 4. Proof of (i). Let f(¢) and g(¢) be the left hand
side and the right hand side of equation (15) as a function of m¤. We know that
f (0) < g (0) for b > 0; g0 (0) = f0 (0) > 0, and g00 (m¤) = 0, and f00 (m¤) > 0
for all m¤ > 0. Thus there exists a unique value of m¤ that solves (15). Let
u(m¤) ´ f(m¤) ¡ g(m¤) + b=(cR)(r + p)(r + ¼ + p). Notice that u(m¤) is strictly
increasing, convex, goes from [0;1) and does not depend on b=(cR). Simple analysis
of u(m¤) establishes the desired properties of m¤.



































44which follows by expanding
¡
m
c ¼ + 1
¢1+
r+p






















Inserting this expression into (38), dividing both sides by b=(cR) and taking the
limit as b=(cR) ! 0 veri¯es our approximation.





















To see that m¤ is decreasing in p notice that the RHS is increasing in p and m.
That m¤ (p + r) is increasing in p follows by noting that since (m¤)2 decreases as p
increases, then the term in square bracket, which is a function of (r + p)m¤, must
increase. This implies that the elasticity of m¤ with respect to p is smaller than





¤ (p + r)) = m



























Proof of (iv). For ¼ ! 0, equation (15) yields: exp
¡
m¤
c (r + p)
¢
= 1+m¤
c (r + p) +
(r + p)
2 b
cR. Replacing ^ b ´ (p + r)
2 b=c and x ´ m¤ (r + p)=c into this expression,











R. We now analyze the elasticity of x with respect





j, we can write that x solves x2 [1 + '(x)] =






























































(j+3), for all j ¸ 1 and x. Then we can write
45'0(x)x
1+'(x) = Ex [j], where the right hand side is the expected value of j for each x.
Hence, for higher x we have that Ex [j] increases and thus the elasticity ´x;R
decreases. As x ! 0 the distribution · puts all the mass in j = 0 and hence
´x;R ! 1=2. As x ! 1 the distribution · concentrates all the mass in arbitrarily
large values of j, hence Ex [j] ! 1 and ´x;R ! 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. By the fundamental theorem of Renewal Theory n
equals the reciprocal of the expected time between withdrawals, which is distributed
as an exponential with parameter p and truncated at time ¹ t. It is exponential because
agents have an arrival rate p of free withdrawals. It is truncated at ¹ t because agents





is the time to deplete cash balances from m¤ to zero conditional on not having a
free withdrawal opportunity. Simple algebra gives that the expected time between
withdrawals is equal to: (1 ¡ e¡p¹ t)=p.
Proof of Proposition 6 . (i) Let H (m;t) be the CDF for m at time t. De¯ne
Ã (m;t;¢) ´ H (m;t)¡H (m ¡ ¢(m¼ + c); t) . Thus Ã (m;t;¢) is the fraction of





so that limh(m;t;¢) as ¢ ! 0 is the density of H evaluated at m at time t. In
the discrete time version of the model with period of length ¢ the law of motion of
cash implies:
Ã (m; t + ¢ ;¢) = Ã (m + ¢(m¼ + c); t ;¢) (1 ¡ ¢p) (40)
Assuming that we are in the stationary distribution h(m;t;¢) does not depend on
t, so we write h(m;¢). Inserting equation (39) in (40), substituting h(m ;¢) +
@h
@m (m ;¢) [¢(m¼ + c)]+o(¢) for h(m + ¢(m¼ + c) ;¢) canceling terms, divid-
ing by ¢ and taking the limit as ¢ ! 0, we obtain (20). The solution of this
ODE is h(m) = 1=m¤ if p = ¼ and h(m) = A
£
1 + ¼ m
c
¤ p¡¼
¼ for some constant
A if p 6= ¼. The constant A is chosen so that the density integrates to 1, so that










(ii) We now show that the distribution of m that corresponds to a higher value
of m¤ is stochastically higher. Consider the CDF H (m;m¤) and let m¤
1 < m¤
2 be
two values for the optimal return point. We argue that H (m;m¤
1) > H (m;m¤
2) for
all m 2 [0;m¤
2). This follows because in m 2 [0;m¤


























In the interval [m¤
1;m¤
2) we have: H (m;m¤
1) = 1 > H (m;m¤
2).
46Proof of Proposition 7. We ¯rst show that if p0 > p, then the distribution
associated with p0 stochastically dominates the one associated with p. For this we
use four properties. First, equation (19) evaluated at m = 0 shows that h(0;p)
is decreasing in p. Second, since h(¢;p) and h(¢;p0) are continuous densities, they
integrate to one, and hence there must be some value ~ m such that h(~ m;p0) >
h(~ m;p): Third, by the intermediate value theorem, there must be at least one
^ m 2 (0;m¤) at which h(^ m;p) = h(^ m;p0). Fourth, note that there is at most one









@m . Summarizing: h(m;p) > h(m;p0) for
0 · m < ^ m, h(^ m;p) = h(^ m;p0) , and h(m;p) < h(m;p0) for ^ m < m · m¤ . This
establishes that H (¢;p0) is stochastically higher than H (¢;p): Clearly this implies
that M=m¤ is increasing in p:
Finally, we obtain the expressions for the two limiting cases. Direct computation































hence h(m¤) ! 1 for p ! 1. Since h is continuous in m, for large p the distribution
of m is concentrated around m¤. This implies that M=m¤ ! 1 as p ! 1.
Proof of Proposition 8.
Let x ´ m¤(r+p)=c. Equation (15) for ¼ = 0 and r = 0, shows that the value of
x solves: ex = 1 + x +^ b=R. This de¯nes the increasing function x = °(^ b=R). Note
that x ! 1 as ^ b=R ! 1 and x ! 0 as ^ b=R ! 0.
To see how the ratio Mp=c depends on x notice that from (29) we have that
Mp=c = Á(x p=(p + r)) where Á(z) ´ z=(1 ¡ e¡z) ¡ 1. Thus limr!0 Mp=c = Á(x).
To see why the ratios W=M and M=M are functions only of x, note from (29)
that
p
n = 1 ¡ exp(¡pm¤=c) = 1 ¡ exp(¡x p=(p + r)) and hence as r ! 0 we
can write p=n = !(x) = M=M where the last equality follows from (24) and !
is the function: !(x) ´ 1 ¡ exp(¡x). Using (32) we have W=M = ®(!) where
®(!) ´ [1=! + 1=log(1 ¡ !)]
¡1 ¡ ! . The monotonicity of the functions Á;!;® is
straightforward to check. The limits for M=M and W=M as x ! 0 or as x ! 1
follow from a tedious but straightforward calculation.


















= ´Á;x ¢ ´x;^ b=R
i.e. is the product of the elasticity of Á w.r.t. x, denoted by ´Á;x, and the elasticity of
x w.r.t. ^ b=R, denoted by ´x;^ b=R. The de¯nition of Á(x) gives: ´Á;x =
x (1¡e¡x¡xe¡x)
(x¡1+e¡x) (1¡e¡x)
where limx!1 ´Á;x = 1. A second order expansion of each of the exponential func-
tions shows that limx!0 ´Á;x = 1. Direct computations using x = °(^ b=R) yields
´x;^ b=R = ex¡x¡1
x(ex¡1). It is immediate that limx!1 ´x;^ b=R = 0 and limx!0 ´x;^ b=R = 1=2.
47Proof of Proposition 9.
(i) By Proposition 3, rV (m¤) = Rm¤, V (¢) is decreasing in m, and V (0) = V (m¤)+b.





@R = M(R) or equivalently that m¤(R) + R
@m¤(R)
@R =
M(R). From (15) we have that: @m¤
@R
£
(1 + ¼ m¤
c )(r+p)=¼ ¡ 1
¤ (r+p+¼)
c = ¡ b
cR2(r +
p)(r+p+¼). Using (15) again to replace b
cR(r+p)(r+p+¼), inserting the resulting
expression into m¤(R) + R@m¤(R)=@R, letting r ! 0 and rearranging yields the
expression for M obtained in (21). (iii) Using (i) in (iii) yields R(m¤¡M) = (n¡p)b.
Replacing M and n using equations for the expected values (18) and (21) for an
arbitrary m¤ yields an equation identical to the one characterizing the optimal value
of m¤, (15), evaluated at r = 0.
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